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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Article VIII, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, as
amended, provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of
procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage
the appellate process. The Legislature may
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of
two-thirds of all members of both houses of
the Legislature.
Utah Code Section 77-20-10 (1990) provides in pertinent
part:
(1) The court shall order that a defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail
or prison, and who has filed an appeal or a
petition for a writ of certiorari, be
detained, unless the court finds:
(a) the appeal raises a substantial
question of law or fact likely to result in:
(i)
reversal;
(ii) an order for a new trial; or
(iii) a sentence that does not
include a term of imprisonment
in jail or prison;
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose
of delay; and
(c) by clear and convincing evidence
presented by the defendant that he is not
likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court,
and will not pose a danger to the physical,
psychological, or financial and economic
safety or well-being of any other person or
the community if released.
Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides in relevant part:
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment,
or probation shall be stayed if an appeal is
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taken and a certificate of probable cause is
issued.
(3) When an appeal is taken by the
state, a stay of any order or judgment in
favor of the defendant may be granted by the
court upon good cause pending disposition of
the appeal.
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be
issued if the court hearing the application
determines that there are meritorious issues
that should be decided by the appellate
court.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The state asserts jurisdiction under Utah Code Section
78-2-2(3)(g), explaining that "in substance" the trial court held
Utah Code Section 77-20-10 unconstitutional.
1).

(State's brief p.

This Court accepted jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78-

2-2(3)(g).
Appendix C).
matter.

(Minute Entry, Case No. 910314, State's brief
It is unclear that jurisdiction lies for this

The district court did not declare section 77-20-10

unconstitutional; rather the district court held that Rule 27 is
the governing law regarding the issuance of a certificate of
probable cause for a stay of sentence pending appeal.

(T. 5, 6,

10-11, 50). Uncertainty was also expressed by the Court of
Appeals, which in transferring this case to the Supreme Court,
stated that "[w]e make no determination whether the trial court's
order granting a certificate of probable cause is a judgment
appealable by the State."

(Order of Transfer, Case No. 910172-

CA, State's Brief Appendix B).

Plainly, if this Court now

-2-

determines that the trial court did not hold Section 77-20-10
unconstitutional, no jurisdiction exists for this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The central issue on appeal is whether a stay of
sentence pending appeal is governed by Rule 27 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure or Utah Code Ann. section 77-20-10-

The

standard of review for this question is a "correction of error"
standard.

Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455f 456 (Utah

1984).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a jury trial, appellee C. Dean Larsen was
convicted under Utah's securities fraud law, Utah Code Ann. §§
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 (Supp. 1991).

(R. 1434-51).

was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

Mr. Larsen

(R. 1424-91).

Mr. Larsen was also ordered to pay a fine and restitution on each
count.

(.Id. )
Following sentencing, Mr. Larsen filed a petition with

the district court for a certificate of probable cause to stay
execution of the sentence pending appeal.

That appeal, which

involves an issue of first impression regarding the necessary
mental state for criminal liability under Utah securities law, is
currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court by petition for
certiorari. (Case No. 920114).

The district court granted Mr.

Larsen's petition and ordered that his "sentence is stayed
-3-

pending a final disposition of the matter on appeal."
(Certificate of Probable Cause, March 4, 1991, attached as
Appendix A to State's Brief).

Mr. Larsen was required to post a

$10,000 surety bond in addition to complying with all previous
court orders regarding his release.

fid.)

The district court issued the Certificate of Probable
Cause "pursuant to the provisions of Rule 27, D.R.CR.P. based
upon the fact that the Court determines there are several issues
that are novel or at least fairly debatable."

(State's Brief,

Appendix A; see also State v. Neelev, 707 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah
1985)(under Rule 27, "the question raised [on appeal] must be
either (1) novel, i.e., there is no Utah precedent that governs,
or (2) fairly debatable.")).

The State appealed the district

court's order granting the stay.

The Utah Court of Appeals

issued an Order of Transfer of the State's appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court, stating that the trial court had "in effect" held
Utah Code Section 77-20-10 unconstitutional.

(Order of Transfer,

Case No. 910172-CA, State's Brief Appendix B.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts beyond those set forth above concerning this case
are unnecessary for this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court correctly applied Rule 27, Utah R.
Crim. P. in deciding Mr. Larsen's petition for certificate of
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probable cause.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-20-10 does not apply because

the subject of release pending appeal is a procedural law matter
within the Utah Supreme Court's authority.
The issue of whether the subject of release pending
appeal is either procedural or substitutive law cannot be
resolved simply by placement of a label as conflicting state
court decisions reveal. A reasoned, issue-specific analysis, an
analysis applied by the federal courts, reveals that the matter
is one of procedural law within the Court's province, as this
Court's treatment of Rule 27 reflects.
Section 77-20-10 cannot be characterized as an
amendment to Rule 27, as the State urges, because the legislature
did not expressly amend Rule 27 as required by Article V and
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution.

Article VIII,

Section 4 and Article V of the Utah Constitution require a clear
statement of legislature intent to amend rules promulgated by the
Court.

Section 77-20-10 also violates the United States

Constitution.

The trial court correctly concluded that Rule 27,

not section 77-20-10, is the law to be applied.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RULE 27 GOVERNS
The issue here appeal is whether the district court was
correct in applying Rule 27 Utah R. Crim. P. and not section 7720-10 to decide Mr. Larsen's request for a stay of sentence
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pending appeal.

In deciding the issue, it is useful first to

chronicle how the Utah Supreme Court has regarded Rule 27 in the
face of past efforts by the State to change the Rule.

This

appeal by the Utah Attorney General's office, as we explain
below, is the most recent attempt among many to add more
stringent conditions to the Court's requirements for stays
pending appeal.

Following this, we analyze the constitutional

issues.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY TREATED RULE 27
AS PROCEDURAL

Rule 27 was first adopted by the Court in 1985 when it
issued the following Per Curiam Order:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article
VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as
amended, the Court adopts all existing
statutory rules of procedure and evidence not
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by
this Court. Effective as of July 1, 1985.
In Re; Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(1985)(copy attached as "Appendix A").

In promulgating these

miles, the Court met its constitutional obligation: "[t]he
Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be
used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the
appellate process."

Utah Const, art. VIII § 4; see also Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1992, enacted 1986)(containing same language
as Utah Const, art. VIII S 4). The Supreme Court heralded the
1985 revision of Section 4 of Article VIII of the Utah
-6-

Constitution, noting that the changes were significant because
"the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court now have the tools to
manage their own affairs and to enhance their status as a coequal branch of government."

Code of Judicial Administration,

Introduction I 4.
Shortly after the Court adopted the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, including Rule 27, the State attempted to
change the Rule 27 requirements, arguing that the standards of
the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act should be used.
Neelev, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985)(per curiam).

See State v.

The Court rejected

this suggestion:
Our rule does not contain the language
urged by the State, but is rather patterned
after the federal law prior to the 1984
changes. The previous federal law required
that, in order to be admitted to bail pending
appeal, a defendant must raise a substantial
question which should be determined by the
appellate court . . . .
We hold that under our Rule 27. in
issuing a certificate of probable cause
preliminary to consideration of release
pending appeal, the court must determine that
the issues of fact or law raised on appeal
are substantial.
Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
The State through the Attorney General then approached
the 1986 Legislature with "proposed amendments" to Rule 27
resembling the language of section 77-20-10.

(See May 15, 1986,

Attorney General's Memorandum in Support of State's Petition for
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Amendments, a copy of which is attached as Appendix B).
Subsequently, the Attorney General's office petitioned the Court
to amend Rule 27 directly, having concluded that "any proposed
changes to Rule 27 should first be presented to the Utah Supreme
Court which has the ultimate authority to adopt and amend rules
of procedure."

(State's 1986 Memo. p. 1, Appendix B).

The

petition requested that Rule 27 be amended to contain language
similar to that of the Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 D.S.C. § 3143.
(See State's Petition for Amendment to Rule, a copy is contained
in Appendix C). x
As early as September 1987, changes to Rule 27 were
being considered by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.2

Supreme Court Advisory Committees

were established in all areas where the Court has rulemaking
authority, including criminal procedure.
Administration Rule 11-101(1)(B).

Code of Judicial

Advisory Committees, such as

the Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, are established by

x

By Minute Entry on August 6, 1990, over two years after
section 77-20-10 became effective, the Court stated: "Pursuant to
passage of U.C.A. 77-20-10 on April 25, 1988. [sic]. This request
for rule change is now resolved."
The meaning of this order
remains unclear in view of the relief originally sought by the
State. (See State's 1986 Memo. pp. 6-9, Appendix B ) .
2

See Minutes of Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Sept. 14, 1987, 1 6 (public record file kept
by Administrative Office of the Courts)(Rule 27 subcommittee
reports that "its work was steadily progressing" and that "the
subcommittee was collecting Law Review Articles on the Federal Bail
Reform Act"). The committee's work on Rule 27 continues today.
-8-

the Supreme Court pursuant to its authority and responsibility
under Article VIII, Section 4, to adopt rules of procedure to be
used by all courts of the state.

Under this authority, the Court

promulgated the Code of Judicial Administration to "establish[] a
procedure for the adoption, repeal and amendment of rules of
procedure and evidence."
11-101(1)(A).

Code of Judicial Administration Rule

The composition of Supreme Court Advisory

Committees broadly represent the legal community, and should
include "practicing lawyers, academicians, and judges" who
"possess expertise within the committee's jurisdiction."

Id,, at

Rule 11-101(1)(C).
Efforts continued in the legislature in January 1988 to
alter the criteria for stays pending appeal through House Bill 79
(H.B. 79). (A copy of the entire H.B. 79 is attached as Appendix
D).

H.B. 79, sponsored by State Representative Ervin Skousen

with assistance from counsel with the Attorney General's
office,3 passed and was codified as section 77-20-10 of the Utah
Code.

House Journal 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 247 (Jan. 26, 1988);

Senate Journal, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 732 (Feb. 23, 1988).
One year later, through its Article VIII rulemaking
powers, the Utah Supreme Court issued another Per Curiam Order:

3

See Minutes of Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Feb. 8, 1988, I 8 (Attorney with the
Attorney General's office "assisted in the drafting and preparation
of the legislation [H.B. 79]"). A copy of the entire Minutes for
February 8, 1988 is contained in Appendix F.
-9-

Pursuant to the provisions of article
VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of Utah,
as amended, and rule 11-101(3)(E) of the Code
of Judicial Administration, the Court adopts
all existing statutory rules of procedure and
evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §S 7735-1 to -33 (1982 & Supp. 1988) not
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by
this Court, with the exception of section 7735-12(cM(see State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(Utah 1987)) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and
(d)(see State v. Copeland, 97 Utah Adv. Rep.
3 [765 P.2d 1266] (Dec. 6, 1988)). Effective
as of January 1, 1989.
In Re: Rules of Procedure and Evidence to be Used in the Courts
of this State (per curiam) (Utah S.Ct. Jan. 13, 1989) (copy
attached as Appendix E).

One of the statutes adopted by the

Court as its own rule was Utah Code Section 77-35-27 (1982,
repealed effective July 1, 1990)(copy attached as Appendix I)
which contained language identical to Rule 27.

Section 77-35-27,

which concerned stays pending appeal, was adopted by the Court
after the legislature passed section 77-20-10 which also purports
to establish requirements for release pending appeal.
This history reflects that the Utah Supreme Court has
consistently regarded the requirements under Rule 27 for
obtaining a stay of sentence pending appeal to be a matter of
procedure decided by the Court pursuant to its rulemaking
authority under Article VIII, Section 4, of the Utah
Constitution.

-10-

II.

RELEASE PENDING APPEAL INVOLVES PROCEDURAL LAW

Determining whether a law is proceduralf within the
province of the Court, or substantive, and thus within the
province of the legislature, is often a difficult task/
Generic definitions of what is procedural law and what is
substantive law offer limited help depending upon the issue. As
we explain below, a more practical approach, focusing on the
subject at issue, and whether the issue has primarily been a
function of the judiciary or of the legislature, is a more
sensible way to determine which branch of government ought to be
responsible for adopting rules with respect to the subject.
In Utah, a law is considered procedural, as opposed to
substantive, if it "does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy
vested rights."

Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990);

Department of Social Serv. v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah
1982).

In an early case, Petty v. Clark. 192 P.2d 589 (Utah

1948) the Utah Supreme Court offered the following definition of
procedural and substantive law:
Substantive law is defined as the positive
law which creates, defines and regulates the
rights and duties of the parties and which
may give rise to a cause for action, as
distinguished from adjective law which

*This is evidenced by the fact that the Attorney General's
Office has simultaneously petitioned this Court and the legislature
in an effort to change the requirements for release pending appeal.
See pp. 7-10 supra: see also Appendix B, p.l (State's Memorandum in
Support of its 1986 Petition).
-11-

pertains to and prescribes the practice and
procedure or the legal machinery by which the
substantive law is determined or made
effective.
Id. at 693-94 (quoted in Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood
Assoc., 795 P.2d 665, 668-69 (Utah App. 1990)).
No Utah case has expressly held that the standards for
a stay of sentence pending appeal is procedural or substantive.
However, as previously noted, the Couart has issued two per curium
Orders adopting Rule 27 along with the other Rules of Criminal
Procedure pursuant to the Court's constitutionally-based
procedural rulemaking power.

See Appendices A and E.

Consistently, (and as the State concedes) the Court in State v.
Neelev, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985) (Per Curium) referred to and
treated Rule 27 as the Court's own rule.

(State's 1986 Memo. pp.

7-8, Appendix B).
As the State recognizes, other state courts addressing
whether this issue is procedural or substantive have reached
different results, often for different reasons.
pp. 10-12).

(State's Brief

Federal decisions, which the State does not

consider, have consistently determined that the provisions of the
Federal Bail Reform Act, on which Utah's section 77-20-10 was
modeled (see infra at pp. 25-31), is a matter of procedural law.
United States v. Ballone, 762 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1200-1201 (7th Cir. 1985);
-12-

United States v. Crabtree, 754 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.) cert, denied
473 U.S. 905 (1985); United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 21
(3rd Cir. 1985).

These decisions provide a useful analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948-51 (1985)(en banc), agreed
with the weight of federal authority that the standards of 18
U.S.C. Section 3143 governing bail pending appeal were procedural
in nature, and therefore held that there was no violation of the
ex post facto clause which only applies to substantive law.

The

reasoning of Affleck and other federal decisions is that
requirements for release pending appeal are procedural because
they do "'not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients
of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish
guilt.'" Id. at 948 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29
n.12, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 n. 12 (1981)).
These decisions reflect a reasonable, issue-specific
approach in deciding whether a rule is procedural or substantive
law; for often a rule can be fairly characterized as being both
procedural and substantive.

See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.

Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 967, 970 (1987)("Rules regulating
matters 'which, though falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification
as either.'")(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 85 S.
Ct. 1135 (1965)).

The characterization of a law as substantive
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or procedural depends on the purpose of the characterization.
See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 Duke L.J. 281 (1989); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure"
in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L.J. 333, 335 (1933).
The above authorities reveal that the power to
promulgate conditions for granting a stay of sentence pending
appeal lies with the judiciary which has been the branch of
government primarily and historically involved with this subject,
as the Washington Supreme Court observed in State v. Smith, 527
P.2d 674 (Wash. 1974):
[T]he fixing of bail and the release
from custody traditionally has been, and we
think is, a function of the judicial branch
of government, unless otherwise directed and
mandated by unequivocal constitutional
provisions to the contrary. The power of the
courts at common law is very well paraphrased
in 8 Am. Jur.2d Bail & Recognizance, § 8
(1963), pp. 787-88
Authority to grant bail
generally is incidental either to
the power to hold a defendant to
answer, or to the power to hear and
determine the matter in which the
defendant is held. At common law
courts had inherent power to grant
bail to prisoners before them and
over whom they had jurisdiction.
Granting bail and fixing its amount
is generally a judicial or quasijudicial function; . . .
(Footnotes omitted.) Since the inherent
power to fix bail is grounded in the power to
hold a defendant, and thus relates to the
manner of ensuring that the alleged offense
will be heard by the court, we believe it to
be implicit that the right to bail is
essentially procedural in nature. Therefore,
-14-

we hold that CrR 3.2(h) was validly
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to
its inherent rule-making authority to
prescribe rules of procedure.
527 P.2d at 677.
The State advances two reasons why release pending
appeal ought to be considered substantive law.

First, the State

argues that labeling this issue as substantive is "consistent
with article I, section 8(2)" in that release pending appeal is
available "'only as prescribed bv law.'" (State's Brief at
p.13)(emphasis in State's Brief).

In so doing, the State

erroneously implies that the phrase "by law" means only "by
statute."

This is simply wrong.

See Minutes of Const. Revision

Comm., Jan. 15, 1988, p.2, I 7 (January 15, 1988)(Attached as
Appendix G)(State Constitutional Revision Commission intended "to
retain the use of the phrase 'as prescribed by law' in the second
paragraph [of Article I, § 8] because it can mean statutes, court
rules, or court cases").
Second, the State aligns with a dissenting opinion in
State v. Currinqton, 700 P.2d 942, 946-48 (Idaho 1985)(majority
held that release pending appeal is procedural law), implying
that denying bail pending appeal is appropriate as "punishment."
This misperceives the purpose of bail.

The purpose of bail is

not punishment, but is to secure the defendant's continued
attendance at future court proceedings.

See In re Pipinos, 654

P.2d 1257, 1264 (Cal. 1982); State v. Musarove, 610 P.2d 710, 712
-15-

(Mont. 1980); see also federal cases cited at pp. 12-13 supra,
including United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th Cir.
1985).
Based on the above issue-specific analysis, the Court
has been correct in regarding Rule 27 as a matter of procedural
law properly within the Court's rulemaking power.

This being so,

Court Rule 27, not Section 77-20-10, controls the standard for
release pending appeal unless and until the Court modifies the
Rule, or until the legislature expressly amends Rule 27 by proper
vote.

See pp. 16-19 infra; see also Slusher v. Ospital by

Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, 443 n. 12 (Utah 1989)(conflict between a
court rule and a statute relating to rule must be resolved in
favor of rule); Utah R. Crim. P. 1(c)(statutes in conflict with
rules are repealed); People v. Williams, 577 N.E.2d 762, 764
(111. 1991), citing People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988)(rule
prevails over conflicting statute in matters within court's
authority).

Thus, the district court's decision to apply Rule 27

in issuing the Certificate of Probable Cause in this case should
be affirmed.
III.

SECTION 77-20-10 DID NOT AMEND RULE 27

Section 77-20-10 did not alter Rule 27 as the State
suggests because the legislature did not expressly amend the rule
as Article V, Section 1 and Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution require.

Section 4 of Article VIII empowers the
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judiciary to "adopt rules of procedure . . . to be used in the
courts of the state."

The Utah Constitution confers a limited

right on the legislature to "amend" these rules which must be
considered in connection with the separation-of-powers provision
of Article V, which states:
The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Const. Art. V S 1.
The legislature may "exercise the powers" conferred
upon the judiciary only as "expressly directed or permitted" by
the Utah Constitution.

Id.. The Constitution does not permit the

legislature to promulgate Rules of procedure; the Constitution
expressly provides only that "[t]he legislature may amend the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon
a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature."

Utah Const, art. VIII § 4. Thus:

Given the fact that the Utah Constitution
places with this court the authority to
promulgate rules of procedure and places
certain limitations on the legislature's
alterations of those rules , see Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, S 4, we certainly will not find
that the legislature has intended to alter
the operation of the rules of procedure
absent a clear statement to that effect.
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Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1097 n. 4 (Utah
1990).

A "clear statement" that Section 77-20-10 was intended to

amend Rule 27 is not found in the statute, either in its codified
form or as H.B. 79.

(See Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10; a copy of

H.B. 79 is attached as Appendix D).

In fact, H.B. 79 expressly

states that it "Amends" Utah Code Ann. SS 77-20-1 and 77-20-8; it
contains no reference to Rule 27. (Appendix D ) .
The legislature is aware that the correct method for
attempting to alter procedural rules requires an express
declaration of intent.

See e.g., H.J.R. No. 26, 49th Leg., Gen.

Sess. (Feb. 2, 1992)(copy in Appendix H).

The first line of

H.J.R. No. 26, a joint resolution concerning a "fully informed
jury" proposal, declared its purpose of "AMENDING THE RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE . . . ."

Id.. This clear intent is repeated

at the beginning and end of the resolution.

Id.

H.B. 79, which

became section 77-20-10, contained no such language.

(Appendix

D).
Express legislative intent to amend is not only
constitutionally required, it is necessary for the judiciary to
function effectively.

Under the State's view, courts may be

forced to sift through legislation, first to identify all laws
that passed by two-thirds vote of both the Senate and House of
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Representatives,5 and then scrutinize those enactments to
determine if the legislation "sought to alter the standards"
(State's Brief pp. 14-15) of any procedural rule and thus should
be deemed an "amendment" to one or more procedural rules.

This

is unworkable and not contemplated by Article VIII, Section 4 of
Utah's Constitution.
Further, rules of procedure may have retroactive effect
in proceedings under way.

See e.g., Department of Social

Services v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); Smith v. Cook,
803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990).

Thus, trial courts and counsel,

unable to monitor the legislature or to discern readily whether a
given statute amends a rule of procedure, could not labor free
from the danger that the "wrong" rule would be applied.
Additionally, without a "clear statement" of intent (an express
amendment), as the Utah Constitution requires (Utah Const, art. V
§ 1; art. VIII § 4 ) , legislation not intended to alter court
rules could nonetheless provide fertile ground for argument that
the converse is true. Appeals would proliferate.
The amendment-by-inference analysis urged by the State
is unworkable and ill advised.

5

This is no small task; the clear majority of all legislation
in Utah this year passed by at least two-thirds vote in both the
house and senate. See House Journals, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess. Jan.
13-Feb. 26, 1992); Senate Journals 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., (Jan. 13Feb. 26, 1992).
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IV.

SECTION 77-20-10 VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

As noted in the jurisdictional statement set forth
herein, it is unclear precisely what the trial court held with
regard to Utah Code Section 78-20-10.

This Court has invited the

parties on this appeal to address the constitutionality of
Section 77-20-10 on the basis that the trial court had
effectively ruled the statute unconstitutional.

On appeal, if

the trial court's ruling can be supported on any basis this Court
should uphold the ruling.
In addition to the Utah Constitutional infirmities
associated with Section 77-20-10 as set forth in Parts II and
III, supra (i.e. violation of the separation of powers provision
of Article V § 1 and of the Judicial rulemaking provision of
Article VIII § 4 ) , the unique language in Section 77-20-10 also
raises serious federal constitutional concerns if it were to be
applied by Utah courts.

Appellee briefly identifies these

federal constitutional issues here.
Section 77-22-10 requires a showing Mby clear and
convincing evidence by the defendant" that his release pending
appeal would not present a flight risk and that the defendant's
release "will not pose a danger to the physical, psychological,
or financial and economic safety or well-being of any other
person or the community if released." (Emphasis added).
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This

underlined language in section 77-20-10 is the only part of the
Utah statute which differs significantly from the language of 18
U.S.C. S 3143, of which the Utah statute is modeled.

The cited

additional language in section 77-20-10 violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it is so
vague and overbroad as to effectively and unreasonably preclude
bail, especially as may be applied in this case.
Although courts have held that the U.S. Constitution
does not guarantee a right to release on bail pending appeal, see
e.g., Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d 594, 597 (2nd Cir. 1979), if a
state implements a bail system, it must do so in a fair and
reasonable manner, because the determination of bail affects
significant issues regarding the liberty interests of
individuals.

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.

Ct.2095, 2101 (1987); Young v. Hubbard, 673 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.
1982); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as
moot sub nom; Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982).

States have a

legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from the potential
for repeat offenses by defendants with a propensity for dangerous
or violent crimes. However, the state's interest is much less
compelling as to non-violent crimes.

Yet Section 77-20-10

applies the same stringent bail requirements to persons convicted
of economic crimes as persons convicted of violent crimes. The
statute also makes no distinction between the seriousness of the
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crime at issue.

Misdemeanor defendants are not treated any

differently than felony defendants—even those convicted of
capital offenses.
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court was
faced with a challenge to a provision of the Federal Bail Reform
Act covering pre-conviction detention based on findings that the
accused had a propensity to commit additional crimes.

The Court

held that the provision did not violate due process and was
reasonable, because that statute focused "only on individuals who
have been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious
crimes."

481 U.S. at 750.

In Young v. Hubbard. 673 F.2d 132

(5th Cir. 1982) and Finetti v. Harris. 609 F.2d 594 (2nd Cir.
1979), denial of bail pending appeal was upheld because a state
scheme in those cases was limited to questions of public safety
and flight risk.

However, there is no corresponding state

interest in applying the same standard to defendants who can show
that they pose no significant risk to the safety of the
community, but who cannot demonstrate because of the vagueness of
the statute that they do not pose a risk to the "psychological,
financial or economic" safety of the community or "of any other
person."
The language of section 77-20-10 is so vague and so
broad that it defies definitions: What is "psychological
safety"?

What is "financial or economic safety"?
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This language

of the statute, which is a departure from the federal model, is
so vague that judicial interpretation and definition of the terms
in any meaningful way is impossible.

While it may be

overreaching to say that the state has no interest in protecting
its citizenry from "economic" and "psychological" harm, the
language of section 77-20-10 to protect that interest is
overbroad.

The standards used in relation to such economic

concerns should not be governed by the same criteria as applied
to persons convicted of violent crimes.
Whatever the language of section 77-20-10 means, there
is no limitation on its application to defendants who pose no
risk of violence or other legitimate state interest, no way to
distinguish between defendants convicted of a misdemeanor as
opposed to a felony, no way to distinguish between serious and
violent crimes and status offenses, and no way to meet the burden
of proving by a clear and convincing standard that release will
not result in some sort of psychological discomfort or economic
burden on a third party.

In effect, the statute if read

literally would result in the complete deprivation of access to
bail.
In this case, Mr. Larsen was convicted of allegations
that he failed to make certain disclosures in connection with
securities offerings.
920114.

See Petition for Certiorari, Case No.

Mr. Larsen has no previous criminal record, is a long-
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term resident of the State of Utah and has demonstrated at every
stage of this case that he does not pose a flight risk.

If this

matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to review
the certificate of probable cause under the standards set forth
in section 77-20-10, application of those standards in this case
will result in a violation of the constitutional standard set
forth above.

If Mr. Larsen is to be detained under the statute,

the only basis for doing so will be on the premise that he
somehow poses a threat to the
safety" of the community.

physical "economic or financial

That language as applied in this case

clearly exceeds any valid state interest.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court could have
reasonably held that Section 78-22-10 was unconstitutional on its
face6 or as it may be applied in this case.

6

Judge McKay's dissent in United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d
944, 955-61 (10th Cir. 1985) provides additional reasons why a
statute such as Utah section 77-20-10 may be considered
unconstitutional on its face. Judge McKay notes that in Evitts v.
Lucev, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985), the Supreme Court found
that where a state provides for an appeal as a matter of right,
then "the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the
due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution." Id.
At 834. Accordingly, in Evitts, the court held that a defendant
has a due process right to effective assistance of counsel on
appeal because "in establishing a system of appeal as of right, the
state has implicitly determined that it was unwilling to curtail
drastically a defendant's liberty unless a second judicial
decisionmaker, the appellate court, was convinced that the
conviction was in accord with law." Id. At 840. The state was
thus found to have "made the appeal the final step in the
adjudication of guilt or innocence of the individual." .Id. Evitts
extended a defendant's fifth amendment right to counsel at trial to
right to counsel on appeal where the state had affords defendants
-24-

V#

IF THE COURT DETERMINES TO REMAND, IT SHOULD
INSTRUCT THE TRIAL COURT TO INTERPRET SECTION 7720-10 CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL LAW

The State asks for reversal of the trial court's ruling
and remand for reconsideration of the certificate of probable
cause under Section 77-20-10.

(State's Brief p. 15). The trial

court's decision should not be disturbedf as we have explained.
However, if this court determines to do so, it should instruct
the trial court to interpret 77-20-10 consistent with its federal
model for two reasons:

First, the legislative history of the

statute indicates that it was the intent of the legislature to
follow with federal law on the issue of post-conviction release.
Second, the interpretation adopted by the federal courts presents
the only possible interpretation of 77-20-10 which avoids an
absurd result.
A.

The Legislature Intended Section 77-20-10 To
Follow Federal Law

It is clear from the face of section 77-20-10 that,
with one significant modification, the statute is modeled after
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), which is part of the Federal Bail Reform Act

a right to appeal as a matter of statutory right.
The rationale
of Evitts should apply to a defendant's eight amendment right to
bail, which also had typically been held to only apply to the pretrial stage. Inasmuch as Utah affords defendant's a statutory
right to an appeal, see Utah code S 77-18a-l(l)(1991), the eighth
amendment rights against excessive bail arguably attach to the
appeal. To the extent that Section 77-20-10 excessively curtails
this right, it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution.
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of 1984.

The structure of the two statutes if virtually

identical and both use virtually identical language in expressing
the grounds for release on bail pending appeal.

See Utah Code

Ann. S 77-20-10; 18 U.S.C. S 3143.
In addition, the legislative history regarding this
issue indicates that it was the intent of the legislature to
align Utah and federal law.

In introducing H.B. 79, which became

section 77-20-10, representative Skousenf the sponsor of the
bill, opened his comments by stating as follows:
House Bill 79 had developed as a result of
some experiences here in the community which
reflect the fact that we need to bring all
laws in conformance with the federal law.
The federal law recently amended the bail
requirements and specifications and our laws
now presently do not conform to those federal
laws.
(Transcribed from Official record of Utah State House of
Representatives, Floor Debate re H.B.79, January 26, 1988).
The bill was introduced to the Senate by Senator Kay
Cornaby, who stated as follows:
I should emphasize this is post conviction
only and it conforms to the federal statute.
My understanding is that the drafter of the
bill tracked the federal bail statute with
post conviction remedies in structuring the
amendment for Utah State.
(Transcribed from Official record of Utah State Senate, Floor
Debate re H.B. 79, February 23, 1988. (emphasis added)).
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The decisions of the federal courts deserve significant
deference in interpreting state statutes modeled on federal law:
Where a state statute is patterned after a
federal statute, the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and inferior federal
courts, interpreting the parent federal
statute, are, even though they were handed
down after the adoption by the state of the
federal statute, most persuasive,
particularly where such interpretations are
the only ones extant with respect to the
disputed words of the state statute.
75 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes S 335 (1974) (emphasis added); see also
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) ('[t]he primary
rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent
of the legislature, in light of the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve"); State v. Tavlor, 82 Ariz. 289, 312 P.2d 162, 165-66
(1957)(subsequent interpretation of federal statute was entitled
to "great weight" in construing state statute); Geraghtv v.
National Bank of Commerce, 8 Wash.2d 437, 112 P.2d 846, 849
(1941).
From the foregoing it is clear that the legislature
crafted section 77-20-10 to align Utah and federal law on the
issue of post-conviction bail, and that federal case law should
be followed in construing section 77-20-10.
B.

The Federal Standard

Both section 77-20-10 and its federal-law model (18
U.S.C. S 3143) contain the following language:

"raises a

substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal
-27-

or an order for a new trial.Ann. S 77-20-10(1)(a).

18 U.S.C. S 3413(b)(2); Utah Code

Taken at face value, as other courts have

observed, this language arguably could be read to mean the trial
court should only permit a post-conviction release if it is
convinced that its own rulings and handling of the case were in
error.

The federal courts have recognized the inherent absurdity

of this interpretation.

In United States v. Greenberq, 772 F.2d

340 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit analyzed United States
v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23-24 (3rd Cir. 1985) and its definition
of the quoted language:
[T]he Third Circuit held that the quoted
language entitled the defendant to bail
pending appeal (provided he is not a danger
to anyone or likely to flee, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3143(b)(1) if his appeal raises a
substantial question that is likely to result
in a reversal if the court of appeals answers
the question in the way the defendants asks
it to do. This of course is not what the
language says; but if it were read literally,
the district judge could not grant bail
pending appeal unless he though the
conviction was going to be reversed — and if
he thought that, why would he not have set
aside the conviction himself without putting
the defendant to the bother of appealing and
us to the bother of reversing? The literal
reading amounts to saying that district
judges shall not grant bail pending appeal,
leaving the courts of appeal with sole
authority to do that . . . .
If Congress
meant to abolish the district court's power
to grant bail pending appeal, it chose an
awfully roundabout way of expressing its
desire.
Greenberq, 772 F.2d at 341.
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The following Federal Courts of Appeals agree with the
Miller rational: United States v. Bilanzich. 771 F.2d 292, 29798 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Affleck. 765 F.2d 944, 95253 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Handy. 761 F.2d
1279, 1280-83 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell. 761 F.2d
1227 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Randell. 761
F.2d 122, 124-25 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1008 (1985);
and United States v. Valera-Elizondo. 761 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.
1985); United States v. Giancola. 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir.
1985) (per curiam).
The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Affleck,
articulated what has come to be the federal standard for
interpreting section 3143(b).

The court adopted a two-part

inquiry; first, does the appeal raise a "substantial" issue for
appeal;" and second, "if the question is determined favorably to
defendant on appeal, is that decision likely to result in
reversal or an order for a new trial of all counts on which
imprisonment has been imposed."

Id. at 953. Cf_. Nealev. 707

P.2d at 649 (applying similar test under Rule 27, Utah R. Crim.
P.).

For purposes of this test, "substantially" has been

interpreted to mean an issue which "is novel, has not been
decided by controlling precedent, or which is fairly doubtful."
Id. (quoting United States v. Miller. 753 F.2d at 23).
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The Federal Courts of Appeal agree that Congress could
not and did not intend to eliminate the procedural power of the
district courts to grant bail to convicted defendants whose cases
are on appeal by requiring a trial judge to somehow rule that his
decisions in the case were erroneous and "likely to be reversed."
Such a definition cannot be tolerated under federal law should
not be tolerated under Utah law.7
Surely the Utah Legislature could not have expected a
lower court judge to rule on an issue of law, and then conclude
that he was likely wrong and would be reversed on appeal.

If a

trial court did have such an opinion, the court would more likely
change his own decision before entering a final appealable order
or judgment.

Thus, a literal interpretation of section 77-20-10

is unworkable and nonsensical, and would place a release pending
appeal beyond any defendant's reach.

For this reason, federal

courts have interpreted the federal statute very similar with
this Court's interpretation of Rule 27. The legislative history
of section 77-20-10 indicates that the legislation was designed
to make Utah law consistent with federal law on this point; this

7

If Section 77-20-10 is applied literally, it would also be
open to attack on numerous constitutional grounds as an arbitrary
elimination of a statutory right to bail in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and a violation of due process because a fair hearing
would be impossible where a trial court is asked to act in effect
as its own court of appeals. See Generally, Lay and Hunt, The Bail
Reform Act of 1984: A discussion 11, William Mitchell L. Rev. 929,
950 (1985).
-30-

Court should implement that standard if it concludes that section
77-20-10 is the law to be applied in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should affirm the
trial court's decision to apply the standards of Rule 27 in
granting a stay of sentence pending appeal.
DATED this 26th day of March, 1992.
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18 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

[COMPILERS NOTE: This administrative
order is published at the request of the Utah
Supreme Court.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In Re:
Roles of procedure and evidence to be used
in the courts of this state.
FILED: September 10,1985
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as amended,
the Court adopts all existing statutory rules
of procedure and evidence not inconsistent
with or superceded by rules of procedure and
evidence heretofore adopted by this Court.
Effective as of July 1,1985.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: RULE 2 7 , UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

:
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
STATE'S PETITION FOR
AMENDMENTS

INTRODUCTION
The S t a t e of U t a h , t h r o u g h t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
initially

a p p r o a c h e d t h e 1986 L e g i s l a t u r e w i t h t h e

proposed

amendments t o U t a h R. Crim. P . 27 (UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 7
(1982))

t h a t are contained in the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n .

After

H.B.

1 6 5 , which c o n t a i n e d t h e R u l e 27 amendments, was a p p r o v e d by t h e
House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,

s e e HOUSE JOURNAL, 4 6 t h L e g . , 1 s t

282 ( d a i l y e d . J a n 2 7 , 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e s p o n s o r

of t h e b i l l

a t t o r n e y s from t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e

and t h e

and
Statewide

A s s o c i a t i o n of P r o s e c u t o r s a g r e e d t h a t any p r o p o s e d c h a n g e s
R u l e 27 s h o u l d f i r s t

rule.

to

be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e U t a h Supreme C o u r t w h i c h

h a s t h e u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y t o a d o p t and amend r u l e s of
Accordingly,

Sess.

the State filed

i t s p e t i t i o n for

procedure.

amendment t o

that

DISCUSSION
A.
Under t h e r e c e n t l y amended v e r s i o n of a r t i c l e V I I I ,
s e c t i o n 4 of t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , ! which was approved by t h e
v o t e r s i n November 1984 and became e f f e c t i v e on J u l y 1, 1985,
t h i s Court has t h e u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y t o adopt and amend r u l e s of
procedure.

The amendments t o a r t i c l e V I I I c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d

the

C o u r t ' s rule-making a u t h o r i t y , which had p r e v i o u s l y only been
accorded by s t a t u t e .

£££ UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-4 (1977); 1943

Utah Laws ch. 3 3 , § 1 (which gave t h e Court rule-making power in
all civil actions).

The L e g i s l a t u r e may amend the r u l e s of

procedure adopted by t h e Court only upon a v o t e of t w o - t h i r d s of
t h e members of both h o u s e s .

UTAH CONST, a r t . V I I I , s e c t i o n 4 .

In a r e c e n t opinion in a c r i m i n a l c a s e , S t a t e v. Banner. 32 Utah
Adv. Rep. 5 ,

P.2d

(1986), t h i s Court noted t h a t ,

1 A r t i c l e V I I I , s e c t i o n 4 now s t a t e s :
The supreme c o u r t s h a l l adopt r u l e s of
procedure and evidence t o be used i n t h e
c o u r t s of t h e s t a t e and s h a l l by r u l e manage
t h e a p p e l l a t e p r o c e s s . The l e g i s l a t u r e may
amend t h e r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e and evidence
adopted by the supreme c o u r t upon a vote of
t w o - t h i r d s of a l l members of both houses of
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Except as o t h e r w i s e
provided by t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e supreme
c o u r t by r u l e may a u t h o r i z e r e t i r e d j u s t i c e s
and j u d g e s and j u d g e s pro tempore t o perform
any j u d i c i a l d u t i e s . Judges pro tempore
s h a l l be c i t i z e n s of t h e United S t a t e s , Utah
r e s i d e n t s , and a d m i t t e d t o p r a c t i c e law in
Utah. The supreme c o u r t by r u l e s h a l l govern
the p r a c t i c e of law, i n c l u d i n g admission t o
p r a c t i c e law and t h e conduct and d i s c i p l i n e
of persons a d m i t t e d t o p r a c t i c e law.

.- 0 _

under

§ 7 8-2-4,2 n[t]he limitations on rules announced by this Court
which supplant legislative enactments are that the Court may not
change the substantive rights of any litigant; the rules must
only be procedural in nature."

32 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. Banner

referred to Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Gibbons Realty, 668
P.2d 535f 539 (Utah 1983), as instructive on the distinction
between procedural rules and substantive rules.

In Brickyard,

668 P.2d at 539f the Court approved of the following standard set
forth in Avila South Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347
So.2d 599 (Fla. 1977):
Practice and procedure encompass the
course, form, manner, means, method, mode,
order, process or steps by which a party
enforces substantive rights or obtains
redress for their invasion. "Practice and
procedure" may be described as the machinery
of the judicial process as opposed to the
product thereof.
Examination of many authorities leads me
2

Section 78-2-4 provides:
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah
has power to prescribe, alter and revise, by
rules, for all courts of the State of Utah,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings and
motions and the practice and procedure in all
civil and criminal actions and proceedings,
including rules of evidence therein, and also
divorce, probate and guardianship
proceedings. Such rules may not abridge,
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of
any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme
Court shall fix the date when such rules
shall take effect and thereafter all laws in
conflict therewith providing for procedure in
courts only shall be of no further force and
effect. Nothing in this title, anything
therein to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall in any way limit, supersede or repeal
any such rules heretofore prescribed by the
Supreme Court.

to conclude that substantive law includes
those rules and principles which fix and
declare the primary rights of individuals as
respects their persons and their property.
As to the term "procedure," I conceive it to
include the administration of the remedies
available in cases of invasion of primary
rights of individuals. The term "rules or
practice and procedure" includes all rules
governing the parties, their counsel and the
Court throughout the progress of the case
from the time of its initiation until final
judgment and its execution. See Kellman v.
Stoltz, 1 F.R.D. 726 (N.D., Iowa, 1941).
347 So.2d at 608 (quoting In re Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 272 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J.,
concurring)).

The proposed amendments to Rule 27 should be

evaluated against this standard.

in In Re; Rules of Procedure and Evidence/ 18 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3 (1985), the Court stated:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article
VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as
amended, the Court adopts all existing
statutory rules of procedure and evidence not
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by
this Court. Effective as of July 1, 1985.
This pronouncement, when viewed in light of the rule-making
standard noted in Banner and Brickyard, raises several issues.
First, there is the question of the extent to which the Court
adopted as its rule of criminal procedure the provisions
contained in the Rule 27 enacted by the Legislature in 1980 and
codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-27. 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, §
1.

Since receiving full rule-making power in 1943, the Court

apparently has never independently devised and adopted rules of
criminal procedure; the Legislature has historically performed
this task. £££. UTAH CODE ANN. § 105-1-1 et seq. (1943); UTAH

CODE ANN. § 7 7 - 1 - 1 e t seq.

(1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 7 - 1 - 1 e t

s e q . (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 e t s e q . (1982) .3

This has

not been t h e case with t h e r u l e s of c i v i l procedure or t h e r u l e s
of e v i d e n c e .

.&££ aannar, 32 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 10; B r i c k y a r d , 668

P.2d a t 539.

In Re:

Rules of Procedure marks t h e f i r s t

time

t h a t t h e Court has i n d e p e n d e n t l y adopted r u l e s of c r i m i n a l
p r o c e d u r e ; and i t did so through an a p p a r e n t w h o l e s a l e a d o p t i o n
of t h e l e g i s l a t i v e l y e n a c t e d r u l e s c o n t a i n e d in UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-35-1 e t seq.

(1982).

There being no p r e v i o u s l y C o u r t - a d o p t e d

r u l e s of c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ' s r u l e s presumably
a r e now t h e C o u r t ' s

rules—unqualified.

The p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 27 (§ 77-35-27) which t h e S t a t e
wishes t o have amended r e l a t e d i r e c t l y t o a c o n v i c t e d

defendant's

e l i g i b i l i t y for r e l e a s e pending appeal—something t h a t a p p e a r s t o
i n v o l v e s u b s t a n t i v e law r a t h e r than p r o c e d u r a l l a w . 4
347 So.2d a t 608.
constitutional

See A v i l a ,

Assuming t h a t a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t ' s

right to bail before t r i a l ,

qualified

see UTAH CONST, a r t .

I , S 8 (Supp. 1985); C a r l s o n v. Landon. 342 U.S. 524, 545-46
(1952); £ f .

Bell v. W o l f i s h , 441 U.S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979)

(where the Court refused t o d e c i d e the open q u e s t i o n of whether
t h e e i g h t h amendment p r o v i d e s a r i g h t t o b a i l in c a s e s where the
defendant i s not l i k e l y t o f l e e ) , may be f u r t h e r
c o n v i c t i o n , _3££ United S t a t e s v . Affleck,

restricted

after

765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th

3

In 1980, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , for t h e f i r s t t i m e , s p e c i f i c a l l y
d e s i g n a t e d t h e r u l e s of c r i m i n a l procedure and s e t them a p a r t in
c h a p t e r 35 of t i t l e 7 7 .

4

To t h e c o n t r a r y ,
procedural only.

subsection

(a) of Rule 27 appears t o be

Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("There is no constitutional right to bail
pending appeal."), the question of when a convicted defendant may
be released with or without bail pending appeal seems to be one
which involves the fixing and declaration of an individual's
primary rights rather than simply the method or process by which
a party enforces substantive rights.5

Indeed, the State's

proposed changes seek to restrict those who are eligible for
release pending appeal in two significant ways:

(1) narrowing

the class of defendants who are eligible for a certificate of
probable cause by requiring a showing of "a substantial question
of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new
trial," and (2) restricting release of defendants issued a
certificate to those who can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that they will not flee or present a danger to any other
person or the community.

See State v. Neeley, 707 P.2d 647, 649

(Utah 1985) (which sets forth a less restrictive standard for the
defendant regarding the substantiality of issues presented on
appeal); State v. Pappas. 696 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1985)
(holding that, once a certificate of probable cause is issued,
"there should be a strong showing of the necessity of custody
before bail is denied").

This Court seemingly recognized the

substantive nature of the rule when the State previously
requested that Rule 27(b) be construed in accordance with the

5 The apparent mixture of substantive and procedural elements in
§ 77-35-27 may have been an oversight by the Legislature.
Creation of the qualified right to release pending appeal
probably would have been more appropriate outside of the context
of a rule of criminal procedure.

language now proposed for subsection (b) in the i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n .
See Neeley, 707 P.2d a t 648-49 (observing that the language from
the federal 1984 Bail Reform Act r e l i e d on by the State r e f l e c t e d
several changes which marked a

n

' s i g n i f i c a n t departure from the

basic philosophy 1 of the purpose of b a i l " ) .

Thus, if the Court

adopted subsections (b) and (c) of § 77-35-27 as part of i t s own
Rule 27, i t arguably did so in v i o l a t i o n of the rule-making
standard enunciated in Banner and Brickyard.

Therefore, i t i s

imperative t h a t the Court f i r s t designate which provisions in §
77-35-27 i t has adopted as part of i t s rule of criminal
procedure.

When t h i s i s made c l e a r , the State w i l l know which

governmental body i t should p e t i t i o n for the proposed changes in
the law.

For example, if the Court decides i t did not adopt

subsections (b) and (c) of § 77-35-27 because they contain
matters of substantive rather than procedural law, the S t a t e w i l l
submit i t s amendments t o the L e g i s l a t u r e , knowing t h a t , because a
Court r u l e i s not involved, the two-thirds majority vote required
under a r t i c l e V I I I , section 4 w i l l not be necessary for adoption
of the amendments.6

On the other hand, if the Court did adopt

those subsections, the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for amendments i s
properly before the Court.
decided a f t e r In Re:

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , in Neeley. a case

Rules of Procedure was issued, the Court

proceeded as though subsection (b) of § 77-35-27 was the C o u r t ' s
6

The assumption would be t h a t § 77-35-27(b) and (c) would remain
in effect as provisions of substantive law duly enacted by the
L e g i s l a t u r e . 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1. Not being part of a
Court-adopted rule of procedure, amendments t o those provisions
would not require the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated two-thirds
majority for l e g i s l a t i v e amendment to such a r u l e .

rule.

Indeed, if Neeley i s i n t e r p r e t e d as i n d i c a t i v e of the

Court's belief t h a t i t was appropriate t o adopt a l l of the
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted Rule 27 pursuant t o the C o u r t ' s rule-making
function, there appears to be no obstacle to consideration of the
S t a t e ' s proposed amendments t o t h a t rule in t h i s forum.
B.
Assuming t h a t the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n i s properly before
the Court, the proposed amendments to Rule 27 should be adopted.
The language the State requests the Court to adopt i s similar to
t h a t found in a federal s t a t u t e enacted as part of the 1984 Bail
Reform Act.

_£££ 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (1985).

The purpose of the

federal l e g i s l a t i o n was t o reverse the former presumption in
favor of bail even after conviction.

Two important p r i n c i p l e s

are thereby furthered:
Once g u i l t of a crime has been e s t a b l i s h e d in
a court of law, there i s no reason t o favor
release pending imposition of sentence or
appeal. The conviction, in which the
defendant's g u i l t of a crime has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, i s
presumably correct in law.
Second, release of a criminal defendant
into the community after conviction may
undermine the d e t e r r e n t effect of the
criminal law, e s p e c i a l l y in those s i t u a t i o n s
where an appeal of the conviction may drag on
for many months or years.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, r e p r i n t e d I n 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3209.

_&££ also United S t a t e s v.

Austinr 614 F.Supp. 1208, 1212 n. 13 (D.C.N.M. 1985).
same reasons, Utah should incorporate the federal

For these

position.

Furthermore, the proposed changes to Rule 27 would eliminate the
ambiguities in t h i s Court 1 s "novel" or " f a i r l y debatable"

standard for determining what is a "meritorious issue" on
appeal.7

Neeley, 707 P.2d at 649.
Finallyf although this Court has never addressed the

constitutionality of Rule 27, there can be little dispute that
the current rule, as well as the proposed amendments, do not
violate the bail or due process provisions of the fifth and eight
amendments to the United States Constitution.

Affleck, 765 F.2d

at 948; United States v. Pollard. 778 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir.
1985); United States v. Powell. 761 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir.
1985).

And, although Utah's constitutional provisions on those

subjects are textually somewhat different from their federal
counterparts, there appears to be no good reason to interpret
them so as to invalidate the pertinent provisions of current Rule
27 or the proposed changes to that rule.

See UTAH CONST, art. I,

§§ 7 and 8 (1971 & Supp. 1985) . £n£ £££ Affleck, 765 F.2d at
955-59 (McKay, J., dissenting).

Significantly, this Court has

never expressed any doubts about placing restrictions on a
convicted person's freedom pending appeal.

See, e.g., Neeley;

Pappas*
CONCLUSION
Several interrelated issues must be resolved in the
process of disposing of the State's petition for amendments to
Utah R. Crim. P. 27.
7

It appears that the Court first needs to

This is not to say that the newly enacted federal standard has
not engendered some debate as to its proper interpretation and
application. Compare Affleck, 765 F.2d at 952, with United
States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3rd Cir. 1985). However,
overall that standard is clearer than the one opted for in
Neeley*

make c l e a r w h i c h p r o v i s i o n s of § 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 7

i t a d o p t e d a s i t s own

R u l e 27 when i t i s s u e d In R e : R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e .
necessarily

This

will

r e q u i r e an a n a l y s i s of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e

r u l e - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y n o t e d i n Banner and B r i c k y a r d ,
may t h e n e i t h e r

reject

The C o u r t

the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n as a request

c h a n g e s i n s u b s t a n t i v e law f

or c o n s i d e r

t h e m e r i t s of

for

the

p r o p o s e d amendments t o R u l e 2 7 .

If

amendments s h o u l d be a d o p t e d f o r

the reasons previously
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Court's

the m e r i t s a r e reachedf

those
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: RULE 27, UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

:

PETITION FOR AMENDMENT
TO RULE

The State of Utah, through its counsel, David B.
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, petitions this Court for
the following amendments to Utah R. Crim P. 27 (codified as UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-27 (1982)):
77-35-27.

Rule 27—Stays pending appeal.

(a)(1) A

sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for
other relief is pending.
(2)

A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation

shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and a certificate of
probable cause is issued.
(3)

When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of

any order or judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by
the court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal.
(b)

A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if

the court hearing Lhe application determines that there are

meritorious issues that should be decided by the appellate court
the defendant has filed a notice of appeal and that the appeal is
not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of

law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order foe a new
trial.

A certificate of probable cause may be issued by tho

trial court or, if denied by the trial court,—by the court to
whom an appeal is taken.

Application for a certificate of

probable cause must be made to the trial court.

The trial

court's decision on the application is subject to review by the
court in which the appeal is pending.

The application for a

certificate of probable cause shall be in writing, state the
grounds for the issuance of the certificate and shall be served
upon the prosecuting attorney.

A hearing on the application for

a certificate of probable cause shall be held after notice to all
parties.
(c)

If a certificate of probable cause is denied, the

defendant shall commence or continue to undergo sentence.

If the

certificate of probable cause is granted, the court granting the
certificate may continue the defendant in custody at an
appropriate place of detention, or admit the defendant to bail or
release pending appeal on suitable terms and conditions.

The

court shall not release the defendant pending appeal unless it
finds bv clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not
likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person
or the community if released.

The decision on the request of the

defendant for release to bail pending appeal is subject to review

by the appellate court in which the appeal is pending for abuse
of discretion.
.is
DATED this

/

'I7 ~~day
day of
o February, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
N^^>^b^x^^x
DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General

TabD

£*£°

UTAH LEGISLATIVE REPORT

HB 79

Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1987
Be it enacted by tbe Legislature of tbe state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Repealed and Reenacted.
Section 59-2-1317, as renumbered and amended
by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1987, is repealed and
reenacted to read:
59-2-1317. Index of propety owners and taxes Tax notice - Collection of taxes.
(1) Upon receipt of the assessment roll, the
county treasurer shall index the names of all property owners shown by the assessment roll. The
commission shall prescribe a form of index which
shall be uniform in all the counties throughout the
state.
(2) The treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes
and furnish to each taxpayer, except those taxpayers
under Sections 59-2-1302 and 59-2-1307, by
mail, postage prepaid, or leave at the taxpayer's
residence or usual place of business, if known, a
notice containing: (a) the kind and value of property
assessed to the taxpayer; (b) the street address of the
property, where applicable; (c) the amount of tax
levied; and (d) if no notice has been provided under
Section 59-2-919, the days fixed by the county
board of equalization for hearing complaints. The
notice shall set out the aggregate amount of taxes to
be paid for state, county, city, town, school, and
other purposes.
(3) If the property has been preliminarily sold for
a prior tax within a period of four years and has not
been redeemed, the treasurer shall stamp on the
notice * Prior taxes arc delinquent on this parcel.
Final tax sale pending/ The notice shall set out
separately all taxes levied only on a certain kind or
class of property for a special purpose or purposes,
and shall have printed or stamped on it the effective
rate of taxation for each purpose for which taxes
have been levied, when and where payable, the date
the taxes will be delinquent, and the penalty provided by law.
(4) The notice shall be mailed at least ten days
before the first day the county board of equalization
meets to hear complaints if no increase in the certified tax rate is proposed, or by November 1 if an
increase in the certified tax rate is proposed under
the procedures established in Section 59-2-919.
The notice shall be in duplicate form and the county
treasurer need not mail out a tax receipt acknowledging payment.
(5) After notices have been mailed, the county
treasurer shall make available the assessment roll,
map books, and statements to the clerk of the
county board of equalization.
Section 2. Retrospective operation.
This act has retrospective operation to January 1,
1988.

H. B. No. 79
Passed 2-24-88, Approved 3-15-88
Effective 4-25-88
Laws of Utah 1988, Chapter 160

Bail Amendments
By Ervin M. Skousen
An Act relating to criminal procedure; providing guidelines for tbe release of a person
sentenced to incarceration during an appeal
of the sentence.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
77-20-1, as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah
1980
77-20-8, as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah
1980
ENACTS:
77-20-8.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953
77-20-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953
Be it enacted by tbe Legislature of tbe state of Utab:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 77-20-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1980, is
amended to read:
77-20-1. Right to bail • Cases requiring hearing.
(JJ A person charged with or arrested for a public
offense shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right
[in ail cases], except where the proof is evident or
the presumption of guilt is strong that the accused
committed a:
((*>A) (a) capital offense;
[(2) A] (b) felony while he was free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony; or
[(3) A] (cj felony while he was on probation or
parole for a felony.
(2) (In these cases] Under Subsection (1), the
accused may be admitted to bail only by a [magistfate] circuit or district court judge, or upon the
circuit or district court's refusal!?] and upon good
cause shown, by a judge of the Court of Appeals,
or a justice of the Supreme Court, after hearing and
finding that the interests of justice do not require
detention without bail.
Section 2. Section Amended.
Section 77-20-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1980, is
amended to read:
77-20-8. Grounds for detaining or releasing
defendant on conviction and prior to sentence.
(1) (a) Upon conviction, by plea or trial, the court
[may] shall order [a] that the convicted defendant
[to be taken into custody or may order the bail
continued pending imposition of) who is waiting
imposition or execution of sentence be detained,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing cv id ence presented by the defendant that the defendant

HB79
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imprisonment in jail or prison:
(b) the appeal is not tor the purpose of delay; and
(c) by clear and convincing evidence presented by
the defendant that he is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, and will not pose a danger to
the physical, psychological, or financial and economic safety or well-being of any other person or
the community if released.
(2) If the court makes a finding under Subsection
(1) which justifies not detaining the defendant, the
court shall order the release of the defendant,
subject to conditions that result in the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that the
court determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community. The conditions
may include that the defendant:
(a) post appropriate bail;
(b) not commit a federal, state, or local crime
during the period of release;
(c) remain in the custody of a designated person
is endorsed shall he filed with the eourti The oemrt
who agrees to assume supervision of the defendant
and who agrees to report any violation of a release
premium paid» or part of • premium, as it deems condition to the court, if the designated person is
reasonably able to assure the court that the defenJ USt. J
dant will appear as required and will not pose a
[(3) For the purpose of surrendering the defen
dam, the sureties, at any time before they are finally danger to the safety of any other person or the
exonerated and at any place within the states may community;
arrest him.]
(d) maintain employment, or if unemployed, actively
seek employment;
Section 3. Section Enacted.
(e) maintain or commence an educational
Section 77-20-8.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
program;
is enacted to read:
(Q abide by specified restrictions on personal
77-20-8.5. Sureties - Surrender of defendant associations, place of abode, or travel;
Arrest of defendant.
(g) avoid all contact with the victims of the
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a offense and with any witnesses who testified against
forfeiture of their bail surrender the defendant and the defendant or potential witnesses who may testify
obtain exoneration of their bail by filing written concerning the offense if the appeal results in a
requests at the time of the surrender.
reversal or an order for a new trial;
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies
(h) report on a regular basis to a designated law
of the undertaking shall be delivered to a peace enforcement agency, pretrial services agency, or
officer, who shall detain the defendant in his other designated agency;
custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing
(i) comply with a specified curfew;
acknowledge the surrender upon one copy of the
(j) not possess a firearm, destructive device, or
undertaking. This certified copy of the undertaking other dangerous weapon;
upon which the acknowledgment of surrender if
(k) not use alcohol, or any narcotic drug or other
endorsed shall be filed with the court. The court controlled substances except as prescribed by a licmay then, upon proper application, order the und- ensed medical practitioner;
ertaking exonerated and may order a refund of any
(1) undergo available medical, psychological, or
paid premium, or part of a premium, as it finds psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug
just.
or alcohol dependency, and remain under the supe(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, rvision of or in a specified institution if required for
the sureties may arrest him at any time before they that purpose;
are finally exonerated and at any place within the
(m) execute an agreement to forfeit, upon failing
state.
to appear as required, designated property, including money, as is reasonably necessary to assure the
Section 4. Section Enacted.
Section 77-20-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, appearance of the defendant, and post with the
court indicia of ownership of the property or a
is enacted to read:
percentage of the money as the court may specify;
77-20-10. Grounds for detaining defendant while
(n) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties in an
appealing his conviction - Conditions for release
amount necessary to assure the appearance of the
while on appeal.
defendant as required;
(1) The court shall order that a defendant who
(o) return to custody for specified hours following
has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced release for employment, schooling, or other limited
to a term of imprisonment in jail or prison, and purposes;
who has filed an appeal or a petition for a wnt of
(p) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably
certiorari, be detained, unless the court finds:
necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question of law as required and to assure the safety of any other
or fact likely to result in:
person and the community; and
(i) reversal;
(q) if convicted of committing a sexual offense or
(ii) an order for a new trial; or
an assault or other offense involving violence
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of against a child 17 years of age or younger, is limited
is not hkelv to flee the jurisdiction of the court, and
will not pose a danger to the physicaJ, psychological, or financial and economic safety or well-being
oi any other person or the community if released.
(b) If the court finds the defendant does not need
to be detained, the court shall order the release of
the defendant on suitable conditions, which may
include the conditions under Subsection 77-2010(2).
[The sureties mayt at any time prior to a forfeiture of their bail» surrender the defendant and
obtain exoneration of their bail by filing written
requests therefor at the time of the surrender * j
[(2) To effect surrender j a certified oopyt in
duplicate, of the undertaking shall be delivered to a
peace officer* who shall then detain the defendant in
his custody as upon a commitment, and who shall in
writing acknowledge the surrender upon one copy of
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or denied access ip anv location or occupati
where children are, including but not limned to:
~~{i) any residence wnere children are on me Dre
sses:
\[[) activities, including organized activities.
which children are involved: and
(iii) locations wnere children congregate, or wh<
a reasonable person should know that childr
congregate.
(3) The court may, in its discretion amend
order granting release to impose additional or di
erent conditions of release.
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COURT RULES
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
IN RE: RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE TO
BE USED IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE

Effective January 1, 1989
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to the provisions of article VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, as amended, and rule 11-101(3XE) of the Code of Judicial
Administration, the Court adopts all existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33
(1982 & Supp.1988) not inconsistent with or superseded by rules of
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court, with the
exception of section 77-35-12(g) (see State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(Utah 1987)) and section 77-35-21.5(4X0 and (d) [see State v. Copeland,
97 Utah Adv.Rep. 3 [765 P.2d 1266] (Dec. 6, 1988)). Effective as of
January 1, 1989.
FILED
January 13, 1989
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

NOTICE Court rules and related mater alb supplied b\ the courts are included
Since all rjle> and amendments mas not ~a.e Pe.n >uppi ed the c.ck or 'he apprupn
ate court should be consulted to determine rne current rules
XXV
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MINUTES
SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Monday, February 8, 1988, 5:30 p.m.
Administrative Office of the Courts
Stewart M. Hanson Jr., Presiding
PRESENT
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.
Judge Rodney S. Page
Judge Tyrone Medley
David Schwendiman
Earl Dorius
Peter Stirba
Judge Dennis Fuchs
Prof. Lionel Frankel

EXCUSED
Marcus Taylor
Judge Cullen Christensen
Robert Stott
Prof. Michael Goldsmith
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale
Karma Dixon
Brooke Wells

Staff
Carlie Christensen
1. Welcome. Stewart Hanson welcomed the
committee members to the meeting.
2. Minutes. The committee voted to approve the
minutes from the January 25, 1988 meeting.
3. Rule 11. Chairman Hanson reported that he
had reviewed Rule 11 in its entirety for the purpose of
revising the rule and making it gender neutral
throughout. Mr. Hanson recommended three specific
changes. First, he recommended that the word "his" be
deleted from the second sentence in paragraph (C) of the
rule and that the sentence read "In non-felony cases, the
court shall advise the defendant or counsel of the
requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial." Second, he recommended that the phrase "his/her"
in subsection (E)(1) of the rule be amended to "the" so
that the sentence would read "That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel, defendant has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Finally,
he recommended that the phrase "his/her" in subparagraph
(E)(5) of the rule be amended to "a" so that the sentence
would read "That the defendant is competent to enter a
plea."
Chairman Hanson then suggested that the committee
discuss the issues resulting from the ambiguous language
contained in 11(G). Earl Dorius suggested that the

language of 11(G) implies that the plea has already been
entered and that the confusion could be eliminated with a
modification to 11(G). He recommended that the word
"Thereafter" be deleted in the last sentence of 11(G) and
that after the phrase "If the judge decides," in that same
sentence, the language "after the plea has been entered"
should be added. Judge Page agreed with Mr. Dorius*
recommendation and indicated that the confusion arose from
the ambiguity as to whether the judge changed his or her
mind after the entry of the plea.
Mr. Dorius questioned whether 11(G) should be
modified to contain specific language prohibiting a Judge
from engaging in the plea bargaining process. Judge Fuchs
indicated that the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited
judges from engaging in ex parte communications with
counsel and that such a prohibition should be sufficient.
Judge Fuchs moved to approve Rule 11 with the
modifications recommended by Chairman Hanson and Mr.
Dorius. Judge Medley seconded the motion. The committee
voted unanimously to approve Rule 11 and distribute it for
public comment.
4. Rule 11 Advisory Comments. Chairman Hanson
recommended that the committee review and discuss the
proposed advisory comments to Rule 11 so that the proposed
comments could be approved and published with the rule.
He referred the committee to the proposed comments which
had been distributed at the last meeting and asked the
committee members whether there was any discussion. Mr.
Dorius suggested that the comments should include an
explanation about the revisions to 11(G). Chairman Hanson
indicated that the comments included an explanation that
the changes to the rule were made to promote clarity and
to remove gender biased language. He suggested that the
existing explanation would be sufficient.
David Schwendiman made a motion to
advisory comments. Judge Page seconded the
committeed voted unanimously to approve the
advisory comments and publish them with the
public comment.

approve the
motion. The
proposed
rule for

5. Rule 27. Chairman Hanson asked whether the
Rule 27 subcommittee was prepared to discuss further
modifications to Rule 27. David Schwendiman indicated
that the members of the subcommittee had not had the
opportunity to research the issues raised at the last
committee meeting and requested that the dicussion on Rule
27 be deferred until the next committee meeting.

6. Rule 12. Chairman Hanson indicated that in
light of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in State
v. Mendoza, that the committee should study Rule 12.
Chairman Hanson suggested that a subcommittee be
established to study the rule and asked which committee
members would like to serve on the subcommittee. After
some discussion, Chairman Hanson appointed Peter Stirba as
the Chair of the subcommittee and appointed David
Schwendiman, Earl Dorius, Professor Frankel and Marcus
Taylor as members.
7. Criminal Procedure Subcommittee. Carlie
Christensen explained that the committee as a whole needed
to begin its study of the rules of criminal procedure to
determine which are substantive and which are procedural
and should be repealed from the Utah Code. Ms.
Christensen reminded the committee that legislation had
been introduced this year to repeal all of the rules of
criminal procedure but that the sponsor of the legislation
had agreed to withdraw it until the advisory committee had
the opportunity to study the rules and make
recommendations.
Chairman Hanson suggested that the committee
needed to review the law in this area prior to undertaking
its study of the rules and asked Ms. Christensen to
research the distinction between procedural and
substantive and distribute to the committee any
information which would be helpful in making that
determination. Chairman Hanson also suggested that if the
research material could be provided to the committee
members prior to the next meeting, that the committee
members should be prepared to discuss Rule 1 through 4 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and make preliminary
recommendations as to whether those rules are procedural
or substantive.
8. Legislative Update. Carlie Christensen
indicated to the committee members that H.B. 79 containing
amendments to the bail provisions of the Code had passed
the House and had been referred to the Senate. She
indicated that she had delivered a letter to
Representative Skousen under Chairman Hanson's signature
outlining the committee's concerns with the legislation.
She indicated that Representative Skousen was willing to
modify the legislation only to the extent necessary to
make the bill compatible with the proposed constitutional
language. Chairman Hanson asked the committee whether
there was any action which could be taken by the committee
concerning this bill prior to the legislative session.
The committee members felt that there was not enough time
prior to the session to finalize their recommendations on
Rule 27. Chairman Hanson then asked whether committee
members individually could take any action which might
minimize the problems created by passage of the proposed

legislation. David Schwendiman indicated that he would be
willing to meet with Representative Skousen concerning the
bill and propose modifications which would make the
legislation compatible with the constitutional language.
Ms. Christensen recommended that Dave Thompson from the
Attorney General's Office be included in that meeting
since Mr. Thompson had assisted in the drafting and
preparation of the legislation. Professor Frankel also
indicated that he would be willing to meet with
Representative Skousen. Ms. Christensen offered to assist
in arranging the meeting.
9. Publication Schedule. Ms. Christensen
indicated that she had been working with the Michie and
Code-Co. publishing companies to establish a firm
publication date for the rules. She explained that once a
firm publication date was established, that the Supreme
Court intended to adopt a rule which would contain a
timetable for all committees to follow during the
rulemaking process. The rule will provide that each
committee receives petitions and studies proposed
modifications to the Rules for 6 to 8 months of the year
and that when the committees complete their study, all of
the rules will be submitted to Code-Co at once for
publication. The rule will also provide that once the
public comment period has expired and the rules have been
submitted to the Supreme Court, the Court will have 60
days to act on the proposed rules. Upon expiration of the
60 day period, all modifications approved by the Court
would be published in a single volume of Court rules. Any
rules which are not acted upon by the Court during the 60
day period, will be held until the next year. Ms.
Christensen explained that a uniform rulemaking process
would ensure that the Court Rules publication was always
current and would streamline the committee's work.
10. Meeting Schedule. The committee agreed to
hold its next meeting on March 14, 1988 at 5:30 p.m. at
the Administrative Office of the Courts.
11. Adjournment. There being no further
business, the meeting was adjourned.
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MINUTES OF THS
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION
JANUARY IS, 1988-12 NOON-ROOM 436 STATE CAPITOL
Members Present:

Dr. Karl N. Snow, Jr., Chairman
Mr. William G. Fowler, Vice-Chairman
Sen. Lyle W, Hillyard
Rep. R. Haze Hunter
Mr, Clifford S. LeFevre
Rep* Ted D. Lewis
Mr. Gayle F. McKeachnie
Mr. Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Mr. Richard V. Strong
Justice Michael D. Zimmerman

Members Excused:

Sen. Wilford R. Black
Sen. Arnold Christensen
Mr. Raymond L. Hixson
Dr. Phyllis C. Southwick
Rep. Olene S. Walker
Ms. Mary Anne Q. Wood

Also Present:

Ms. Carlle Christensen, Office of the State Court Administrator
Judge Scott Daniels, Third District Court
Sen. Winn L. Richards

Staff I resent:

Robin L. Riggs, Executive Director
Joy Jensen, Secretary

*•

Call to Order—Chairman Snow called the meeting to order at 12:15 p.m.

2.
Bail Provision—Chairman Snow stated that at the last meeting the CKC had
requested the Governor's Council on Victims and the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee on Criminal Procedure to make a recommendation for amending Art. I,
Sec. 8 of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Riggs distributed copies of the completed
proposal to CRC member* (copy on file in the Office of Legislative Research and
General Counsel).
Chairman Snow then asked Carlle Christensen, Office of the State Court
Administrator, to review the recommendation. She stated that it was difficult to
find a consensus among members of the advisory committee and that the proposal
represents a majority viewpoint and not unanimity. The proposal retains the existing
categories of offenders that may be denied bail: persons charged with a capital
offense, and persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole or while free
on ball awaiting trial OQ a previous felony charge. She stated that the only difficulty
with the language was ta dtflntag what standard Is meant by "proof is evident or the
presumption strong.* Moat lawyers she contacted did not understand the standard
because of the archaic language. As a result, the proposal deletes that language and
replaces it with "substantial erldenctt" which is s more understandable term. The
proposal then adds one other category of offender that may be denied bail: persons
charged with a crime wbm the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
person would constitute a danger to any other person or to the community or Is likely
to flee the Jurisdiction ot the court if released on bail.

Minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission
January 1$, 1988
Page Two

Ms, Christer.sen stated that there were two substantial issues of debate
concerning the new category. First, the category is all persons charged with a
crime, rather than just a felony. The drafting committee initially recommended
"felony" because of a concern that under "crime," misdemeanor offenders could be
held without bail on evidence unrelated to the offense. However, the majority of the
f u l l committee disagreed and retained the word "crime" in the proposal. Second, the
standard for determining danger to the community and others is "clear and
convincing evidence." The drafting committee initially recommended a standard of
"substantial danger." The full committee retained "clear and convincing evidence"
because of the overuse of the word "substantial" and a concern that "substantial
danger11 was ambiguous.
She then explained that the proposed second paragraph provides a right to bail
pending appeal as provided by law, as opposed to the first paragraph which provides
for pre-conviction bail. She stated that the committee decided to recommend that
the Legislature determine the standards for post-conviction bail under the second
paragraph. Finally, she stated that two committee members rejected the proposal
outright, although a majority of seven members approved it.
The CRC then discussed the use of the word "crime" as opposeo to "felony/
Judge Daniels, Third District Court, and Ms. Christensen both stated that "crime1'
provides greater flexibility to Judges. Justice Zimmerman and Mr. Fowler argued
that the use of the word "felony" wa3 sufficient to protect the public. Justice
Zimmerman then stated that under the word "crime," justices of the peace could
deny bail for misdemeanor offenses, which concerns him.
MOTION:
Justice Zimmerman moved, seconded by Mr. Fowler, to replace
"crime" with "felony" in the proposal in the category of persons posing a danger or
likely to flee. The motion passed u n a ^ m ^ s l y with all members marked present at
the meeting voting in favor.
Sen. Hillyard then sjg^ested tnat the word "substantial" be inserted before the
word "danger" in the oroposal where it states ''evidence that the person would
constitute a danger to any other person or to the community." Rep. Lewis stated
that he would prefer to have a lesser standard of proof than a lesser standard of
danger. There was additional discussion on this issue.
MOT10M: Sen. Hillyard moved, seconded by Rep. Lewis, to insert "substantial"
befora "danger" in the draft where it refers to danger to others and the community.
Tht amotion passed unanimously with ail members marked present at the meeting
voting in favor.
The CRC also decided to retain the use of the phrase "as prescribed by law" in
tha aecood paragraph of the proposal becaust i t can mean statutes, court rules, or
court cases. There was also more discus*ioo on the issue of Judicial discretion in
denying bail under the language of the proposal

Minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission
January 15, 1988
Page Three

Chairman Snow then introduced Sen. Winn L. Richards, wno has s,ivad\ filed a
constitutional amendment to make substantially the ^arr.e ohsn^es to the Utah
Constitution as those recommended today.
MOTION:
Rep. Lewis moved, seconded by Mr. LeFevre, to recommend
favorably to the Legislature the proposal, as amended, of the Suoreme Court's
Advisory Committee on Criminal Procedure to amond \rt. I, Sec. 8. .;^d£e Tamcis
stated that the Governor's Council on Victims would prooablv i* it? w th the
recommendation. The motion passed unanimously with all members r . r ^ e d present
at the meeting voting in favor.
Sen. Richards then agreed to substitute the CHC -eo< ~ ^ M * on
proposal.

"to

K

:s

*•
Other Business—Mr. Matheson distributed a statement on behal'* of himself,
Chairman Snow, and Justice Zimmerman relating to tK e fiscal home :- c p< *cr>> of
local governments (copy on file in the Office of Leg.slative Research and General
Counsel).
4.

0336c

Adjournment—The meeting was adjourned at 1:10 p.m.
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13
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14

CLARIFYING DUTIES AND POWERS OF JURY;

15

OF

16

AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

17

JURORS

TO

BE

RULES

INFORMED

PROHIBITING

OF
BY

CRIMINAL
THE COURT;

DISQUALIFICATION

JUROR FOR VOTING HIS CONSCIENCEs PROVIDING FOR HARMFUL ERROR;

WHEREAS a revision of the Utah Rules of

Criminal

Procedure

of

the

state of Utah is necessary to more clearly define the role of the jury:

20
21

FOR

THE

Be it resolved by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

18
19

A

PROVIDING

AMENDING

NOW,

THEREFORE,

BE IT RESOLVED that the following amendments to the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure be adopted:

22

Section 1.

23

Rule 19

24

(a)

Rule 19 is amended to read:

Instructions.

At the close of the evidence or at

reasonably

time

as

court

26

court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request.

27

same

28

parties.

The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon

29

request;

and

copies

it

of

shall

such

any

earlier

25

time

directs,

such

party may file written request that the

requests

furnish

the

shall

counsel

be

with

At

the

furnished to the other

a

the

copy of its proposed
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1

instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may

2

given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.

3

(b)

Upon

each

written

request so presented and given, or refused,

4

the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or

5

part

6

the endorsement what part of the charge

7

refused.

8
9

be

No

party

may

assign

as

was

error

given

any

and

before

11

objects and the ground

12

failure

13

avoid a manifest injustice.
(d)

to

object,

of

his

error

objection.

may

to

the

was

change

a

party*s

The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and

they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.

2i

part

be assigned to instructions in order to

16

20

what

Notwithstanding

the

19

If

the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he

15

18

it.

portion of the charge or

omission [therefrom] from it unless he objects [thereto]

10

17

sign

given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by

(c)

14

be

if

court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that

(e)

The

jury

shall

be

informed

of

its

rights,

powers,

and

responsibilities as follows:
(i)

to

first

apply

the

law to the facts presented in the case tc

decide if the defendant has violated the law as summarized by the court;
(ii)

if the jury determines that the law has been violated,

but

it

22

cannot in good conscience support a guilty verdict, it is not required to

23

do so;

24
25

(iii)
influence,

to reach a just and fair verdict that is unhampered by outside
and

in doing this the jury shall consider to what extent the
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1

defendantfs actions have actually caused harm or otherwise have

2

the jurors' sense of right and wrong;

3
4

(iv)

to consider whether or not the law is constitutional, according

to the Utah and United States Constitutions;

5
6

(v)

to

consider

whether or not the defendant had sufficient motive

or intent in order to support a knowing action; and

7

(vi)

to judge both the merits of the law under which

8

has

9

and even if review of the evidence strictly in terms

been

charged

indicate

11

guilty if the jury believes that a guilty verdict

12

injustice.
(f)

a

As

guilty

part

verdict,

of

the

their

oath,

the

jurors

understand the information required in Subsection

15

rights and requirements.
(g)

It

is

defendant

of

the

law

would

jury may still find the defendant not

14

16

the

and the wisdom of applying that law to the defendant,

10

13

violated

would

shall
(e)

be

a

manifest

affirm that they
concerning

their

declared to be part of the defendantfs fundamental right

17

to trial by jury for the jurors to be so informed, and failure to conduct

18

any criminal trial in

19

harmful error, and shall be grounds for mistrial.

20

(h)

No

potential

accordance

juror

with

this

section

shall

constitute

may be disqualified from serving on a jury

21

because he expresses willingness to judge the law or its application,

22

to vote according to his conscience*

23
24

(i)

Arguments

of

the

respective

court has instructed the jury.

parties

Unless otherwise

or

shall be made after the
provided

by

law,

any
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court.
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time for argument shall be within the discretion of the

3

Section 2.

4

As provided in Utah Constitution Art. VIII, Sec. 4,
up

on

Effective Date.

5

effect

approval

by

6

members of the Legislature.

this

act

takes

a constitutional two-thirds vote of all the
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UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED
1953
REPLACEMENT
VOLUME 8C
1982 EDITION
Code of Criminal Procedure

77-35-27. Rule 27 — Stays pending appeal, (a) (1) A sentence of death
shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for other relief is pending.
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if
an appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued.
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order or judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good
cause pending disposition of the appeal.
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if the court hearing
the application determines that there are meritorious issues that should
be decided by the appellate court. A certificate of probable cause may be
issued by the trial court or, if denied by the trial court, by the court to
whom an appeal is taken. The application for a certificate of probable cause
shall be in writing, state the grounds for the issuance of the certificate
and shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney. A hearing on the application for a certificate of probable cause shall be held after notice to all
parties.
(c) If a certificate of probable cause is denied, the defendant shall commence or continue to undergo sentence. If the certificate of probable cause
is granted, the court granting the certificate may continue the defendant
in custody at an appropriate place of detention, or admit the defendant
to bail or release pending appeal on suitable terms and conditions. The
decision on the request of the defendant for release to bail is subject to
review by the appellate court for abuse of discretion.
History: C. 1953, 77-36-27, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14, § 1.

